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Abstract
The merite of an independent EuroFed are discusaed within the
context of a tax~aeignioragc amoothing model for a monetary union.
There ia an incentive to uee a surpriae inflation tax to wipe out the real
value of governrru~nt debt and of wage contracte, becauae this allowa
a cut in diatortionary taxes and a booat to employment and private
conaumption. If dependent central banka can pre-commit, there is no
case for an independent EuroFed as this leada to a sub-optimal gov-
ernment revenue mix. However, if only an independent EuroFed can
guarantee sufficient diecipline, a case cao be made for it over and above
a monetary union with a non-cooperative or cooperative central bank.
Thia case is atronger when the averaion to inflation ia high, when the
outstanding atock of nominal government debt ie high, when the un-
derground economy ia insignificant and when there is not much wage
indexation. Even if all contracts are indexed, there is an incentive
for unanticipated inflation if money demand dependa on expected in-
flation. However, if private agents are tational in their [orecaets of
inflation, government apending is financed through temporary bouts
in taxation and inflation and, given that all contracts are indexed, no
case for an independent central bank can be made. Competition be-
tween central banke of a monetary union inducea excessive inflation,
because each bank fails to internaliae the externalities asaociated with
appropriating too much seigniorage írom the common central bank.
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'Put not your trust in money, but your money in truat"
Oliver Wendelt Aotmea
1 Introduction
In Europe eteps aze under way for the construction oí an economic and
monetary union (EMU). This should lead to the removal of physical, tech-
nical and administrative barriers to international trade in goods, factors of
production and financial assets. Much progress has already been made in
establishing a free-trade zone. The 1989 Delora Report and the 1990 Report
of the Commission of the European Community also argue fot the establish-
ment of an independent European System of Central Banks (ESCB):
"This new System would have to be given the full status of an au-
tonomous Community institution ... the System would be com-
mitted to the objective of price stability ... the ESCB Council
should be independent of instructions from national governments
and Community authorities; to that effect the members of the
ESCB Council, both Governors and the Board members, should
have appropriate security of tenure" (Delors Report, 1989, article
32).
Tn contrast to the Banca d'Italia or the Bank of England the European
Cetttral Bank, called the EuroFed, sl~ould be free o[ political pressures and
thus have an independent status. The EuroFed should thus be much more
like the Bundesbank t or De Nederlandsche Bank, because both these in-
stitutions have an excellent anti-inflation discipline and are mostly free of
pressures to accommodate demands for more government spending or higher
'In fact, the Delora Report advocatea a federal atructure in which the nstional ceatral
banks arc incorporated in a F,SCB. The ESCB should hsvc three Icvela of organisstion:
(i) the Council of the ESCB conaiating o[ the presidenta o[ the national central banke,
which are independent o[ the Community and national authoritiea (c[. the German Zen-
tralbankrat); (ii) the Board o[ the ESCB, which monitora monetary developmente and
overseea the implementation o( the common monetary poGcy (cf. the Direktorium); and
(iii) the national central banka which ezecute the decieiona tsken by the Coancil (c[. the
Landeszentralbanken). ~
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wage demands. 'fhis paper assesses the case tor an independent common
central bank (say the EuroFed) for a monetary union (say the EMU) within
the context ofa simple tax~seigniorage smoothing model. Since the case for
an independent common central bank depends on its ability to pre-commit
itselt to announced monetary policies, it ia essential to allow for an incentive
to have a surprise inflation tax. This paper allows for the issue of nominal
government debt, in which case the monetary authorities have an incentive
to levy an unanticipated inflation tax in order to reduce the real value of
debt service, and for the presence of nominal wage contracts, in which case
there is an incentive to use surprise inflation to boost employment.
To illustrate the azgument, attention is first iocussed on the monetary
discipline an independent central bank can offer in safe-guarding the real
value of government debt. This is probably the most important source of
time inconsistency for Europe, but of course the azguments in favour of an
independent common central bank can also be made in terms of removing
the incentive to use unanticipated inflation to erode the real value of the pre-
determined nominal wage and thus engineer a transitory gain in employment
(along the lines of Barro and Gordon, 1983). ftowever, wage indexation has
been quite common in Europe, so this may limit the possibility of using an
unanticipated monetary expansion tor this purpose. Much work has been
done on the stabilisation aspects of monetazy unification and relatively little
work has been done on the allocative and public-finance aspects of a mone-
tary union. It therefore seems worthwhile to also focus on the incentive to
wipe out the real value of government debt. Of course, the first-best policy is
to destroy such incentives to renege on optimal contracts altogether through
the issue of indexed rather t}~an nominal bonds and through indexation of
all other contracts.
Section 2 sets up a simple model of tax~seigniorage smoothin8ln a mon-
etary union where governments have to rcly on the issue of nominal debt.
This model is based on the work of Gros (1988), who developed a similar
model to decide whether it is optimal for a small country to enter or stay
out of the European Monetary System. Section 3 looks at the situation
where the governments can pre-commit to announced policies, because they
are trusted by private agents. Absence of international cooperation among
the governments of the monetary union then leads to excessive inflation and
monetary growth throughout the region and to too low tax rates, because
each country fails to internalise the adverse eífects of appropriating more
seigniorage from the common central bank on the common inflation rate.
Section 9 examines the situation where governments are not believed to
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"Put not your trust in money, but your money in trusln
Oliver Wendell Aolmes
1 Introduction
In Europe steps are under way for the construction of an economic and
monetary union (EMU). This should lead to the removal of physical, tech-
nical and administrative barriers to international trade in gooda, factore of
production and financial assets. Much progress has already been made in
establishing a free-trade zone. The 1989 Delors Report and the 1990 Report
o( the Commission of the European Community also argue for the establish-
ment of an independent European System of Central Banks (ESCB):
"This new System would have to be given the full status of an au-
tonomous Community institution ... the System would be com-
mitted to the objective of price stability ... the ESCB Council
should be independent of instructions from national governmente
and Community authorities; to that effect the members of the
ESCB Council, both Governors and the Board members, should
have appropriate security of tenure" (Delors Report, 1989, article
32).
In contrast to the Banca d'Italia or the Bank of England the European
Central Bank, called the EuroFed, should be free of political pressures and
thus have an independent status. The EuroFed should thus be much more
like the Bundesbank t or De Nederlandsche Bank, because both these in-
stitutions have an excellent anti-inflation discipline and are mostly free of
pressures to accommodate demands for more government spending or higher
~In (act, the Delora Report advocatea a federal atructure in which the national centra!
banka are incorporated in a ESCB. 1'he ESCB should have three Icvele of organisation:
(i) the Council o( the ESCB conaiating o[ the preaidente of the national central bsnka,
which are independent of the Community and national authoritiea (cf. the German Zen-
tralbankrat); (ii) the Board of the ESCB, which monitora monetary developments and
overseea the implementation o[ the common monetary policy (cf. the Direktorium); and
(iii) the national central banka which execute the deciaione taken by the Council (cf. the
Landeazen tralbsnken ). .
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wage demands. 'I'his paper assesses the case for an independent common
central bank (say the EuroFed) tor a monetary union (say the EMU) within
the context of a simple tax~seigniorage smoothing model. Since the case for
an independent common central bank depends on its ability to pre-commit
itself to announced monetary policies, it is essential to allow for an incentive
to have a surprise inflation tax. This paper allows for the issue of nominal
government debt, in which case the monetary authorities have an incentive
to levy an unanticipated inflation tax in order to reduce the real value of
debt service, and for the presence of nominal wage contracts, in which case
there is an incentive to use surprise inflation to boost employment.
To illustrate the argument, attention is first focussed on the monetary
discipline an independent central bank can offer in safe-guarding the real
value of government debt. This is probably the most important source of
time inconsistency for Europe, but of course the azguments in favour of an
independent common central bank can also be made in terms of removing
the incentive to use unanticipated inflation to erode the real vatue of the pre-
determined nominal wage and thus engineer a transitory gain in employment
(along the lines of Barro and Gordon, 1983). However, wage indexation has
been quite common in Europe, so this may limit the possibility of using an
unanticipated monetary expansion for this purpose. Much work has been
done on the stabilisation aspects of monetary unification and relatively little
work has been done on the allocative and public-finance aspects of a mone-
tary union. It there[ore seems worthwhile to also focus on the incentive to
wipe out the real value of government debt. Ot course, the first-best policy is
to destroy such incentives to renege on optimal contracts altogether through
the isaue of indexed rather than nominal bonds and through indexation of
all other contracts.
Section 2 sets up a simple model of tax~seigniorage smoothing in a mon-
etary union where govcrnments have to rely on the issue of nominal debt.
This model is based on the work of Gros (1988), wlio developed a similar
model to decide whether it is optimal for a small country to enter or stay
out of the European Monetary System. Section 3 looks at the situation
where the governments can pre-commit to announced policies, because they
are trusted by private agents. Absence of international cooperation among
the governments of the monetary union then leads to excessive inflation and
monetary growth throughout the region and to too low tax rates, because
each country fails to internalise the adverse effecta of appropriating more
seigniorage from the common central bank on the common inflation rate.
Section 4 examines the situation where governments are not believed to
3
have sufócient monetary discipline and thus cannot pre-commit. This leads
to higher inflation and lower conventional tax rates in equilibrium than when
the central banks can pre-commit, because governments cannot resist the
temptation to wipe out the real value of debt service and the private sector
realises this. In such a situation it is also possible to construct an example
in which international policy coordination is counterproductive. Section 5
shows that, if central bankers have sufficient monetary discipline, an inde-
pendent common central bank comes off worst from the welfare point of view
because it leads to a sub-optimal government revenue mix with too high con-
ventional tax rates. However, if central bankets are known to succomb to
pressures to levy a aurprise inftation tax, a case for an independent common
central bank can be made, especially when the outstanding stock of nom-
inal govcrnment debt in the monetary union is high, when the aversion to
inflation is high, and when the costs o[ collecting conventional taxes is (due
to the absence of a well-developed black economy) low. Section 6 extends
tlie analysis to allow for the effects of unanticipated inAation on unemploy-
ment, output and private consumption and shows that this reinforces the
case for an independent common central bank. This section also integrates
the positive ~screw-up" theories of inflation with the public-finance theories
of tax~seigniorage smoothing and thus provides a rationale why the policy
of eridicating all labour-market distortions may not be first-best when there
is a ncod to finance public goods.
'I'hc tiino iuconsistency problcrns discussc~d iu Sectioux 2-Fi can be avoided
when goveruments issue indcxed debt and wage contracts iuclude indexation
clauses. However, if the velocity of circulation depends positively on the
nominal interest rate and money demand depends negatively on the expected
intiation rate, an additional source of time inconsistency arises. Section 7
shows that the optimal inflation rate is lower than under the quantity theory
of money, because governments now take account of citizens economising on
holdings of money. Absence of international policy coordination leads to
excessive inflation and to too low tax rates. Since it reduces the base for
raising seigniorage revenues, tax rates do not fall as much as they would
otherwise. Lack of monetary discipline leads to a higher optimal inflation
rate, because agents do not trust the independent common central bank not
to repudiate- The case for an independent common central bank is thus
strenghtened when one takes account of nomiaal interest rates and expected
inflation on money demand. Section 8 builds on Obstfeld (1991a,b) and
discusses the micro foundationa of the ongoing strategic interactions between
the governments and private agents of a monetary union. This leads to the
4
exciting insight that, even though it is optimal to smooth intratemporal
distortions and let tax ratea and inftation rates go up and down together,
it is no longer optimal to smooth intertemporal distortions in the sense
that tax and inflation rates need no longer follow random walks. Instead,
a permanent increase in government spending leads to a temporary bout of
inflation and a temporary increase in tax rates which allows a build-up of
government assets. The idea is that the resulting increase in interest income
eventually finances the increase in spending without any distortions. This
section also extends the analysis to ensure that in steady state full liquidity
and Friedma.n's optimum quantity of money prevails and shows that, given
that all contracts are indexed, no case can be made for an independent
central bank. Section 9 concludea with a summary of results.
2 A monetary union with nominal government
debt
The monetary union consists of N member states, denoted by the subscripts
i- 1, ... , N. For simplicity, purchasing power parity holds throughout
the monetary union. Because exchange rates are irrevocably fixed, there
must be a cornmon infiation rate throughout the region. The treasury of
member state i has a primary budget deficit, which is defined as the excess
o( exhaustive governrnent spending (g;) over tax revenues (r,). Its (ull deficit
includes interest payments on outstanding nominal treasury debt (r;d;) and
must be financed by selling treasury debt (d;) or by seignioragc revenues
(s;). The flow budget identities of the treasuries can thus be written as
d;fs;-g;-r;~r;d;, i-1,...,N, (1)
where all quantity vatiables are expressed as fractions of the full-employment
level of national iucome and r; denotes the growth-corrected ex-post real
interest rate of country i. As long as individual treasuries remain solvent,
they are free to borrow and lend on the open market at a given rate of
interest. Solvency requires that treasury debt does not grow at a rate faster
than the interest rate in the long run. If this is the case, one obtains the
present-value budget constraints of the treasuries:
5
ridi f 9; G r; f 9;P, i- 1, . .., N (2)
where the permanent level of exhaustive government spending is defined as




and rp and s? are defined similarly. Hence, solvency requires that the
current level of treasury debt plus the present value of the stream of future
exhaustive government spending must not exceed the present value of future
tax and seigniorage revenues.
The member states of the monetary union collect seigniorage from the
common central bank. The bank obtains its funds from printing money,
because private agents hold money without getting a return on it. The
budget constraint of ttie common central bank is thus given by
N 1
~~ s; I - BmN
`~-r j
(3)
where B denotes the common monetary growth rate of the region and m
denotes tlie holdings of real money balances by an individual country. For
simplicity, the velocity of circulation and thus m are the same and constant
for each country of the monetary union. The quantity theory of money thus
holds for the region and says that common rate of inflation (a) is determined
by the excess of monetary growth (B) over the exogenous growth in full-
employment real income (n):
a-B-n. (4)
The expected or ex-ante (growth-corrected) real interest rate (p), the real
interest rate for short, is according to the Fisherian hypothesis determined
by common consumption tastes and production technologies throughout the
region, more or less exogenous and in any case independent of expected
inflation tates. For given tastes and production technologies, any change in
nominal interest rates must then be due to a change in expected inflation
s
rates. Since treasuries guarantee a nominal rate of return, the realised or ex-
post real intcrest rates are rclevant for the borrowing and lending activities
of the treasuries:
r;-pfx; -A; (5)
where a; denotes the expected inflation rate in country i. '1'he ex-post real
interest rate decreases with unantitipated inflation, which is one way in
which governments can reduce the level of their inflation-corrected deficits
and thus reduce the growth of their debt-GDP ratios Z.
Finally, the presence of integrated capital markets throughout the mone-
tary union, the absence of capital controls and risk-neutral arbitrage ensure
that nominal interest rates, ex-post real interest rates and expected inflation
rates are equalised throughout the region:
r; - r, x; - x, x~ - n`, i- 1,..., N. (6)
Each treasury wishes to employ the most efficient revenue mix for fi-
nancing a given stream of exhaustive government spending. Each treasury
minimises the excess burden associated with raising tax and seigniorage rev-
enues. The dead-weight losses correspond to the familiar welfare triangles
and are proportional to real output 3, hence the welfare-loss function of
treasury i corresponds to:
~Since d; is not a predetermined variable, an unanticipated increase in the level rather
than lhe growtlt rale ofthe money supply induces s correeponding increase in the price
level and can thue be used to wipe out the real value o[ treasury debl "at the atroke
o( a pen". Thie paper is concerned with unsnticipated changea in inflation, because
unanticipated changee in the level of the money supply correapond to capital levies and
are wmewhat unrealiatic.
~It ie difficult to juetify lhe coate of inflation in terme of trianglea under the money
demand echedule, eince under the quantity theory thie echedule is ftat and the empirical
magnitude of theae costa are fairly amall anyway. However, there are many other rea-
eone why inflation ie coatly and ahould a(íect the welfaze lose of a government (Fiacher
and Modigliani, 1975). For example, a higher level of anticipated inflation may induce a
higher variance of inflation which (in the abaence of indezation) cauaea a miaaHocatioo of
7
W; - 2~~ exp(-pt)[T~(t)2 f pa(t)2]dt, p~ 0. (7)
It is possible to distinguish between cooperative outcomes (denoted by a su-
perscript C) and non-cooperative outcomes (denoted by a superscript N). If
the governments of the member states do not cooperate, each government
chooses a time-path of tax and seigniorage rates (r and s;) to minimise
the welfare loss function (7) subject to equations (1)-(6), taking the tax and
seigniorage rates of rival governments ( ri and s„j ~ i) as given. The result-
ittg non-cooperative outcome corresponds to a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. If
the governments do cooperate and have an equal say in running the common
central bank, they jointly choose {r, s;, i- 1, ..., N} to minimise the total
welfare loss (Wl f W2 f ...WN).
Following Barro and Gordon ( 1983) and Barro ( 1983), it is also possible
to distinguish between rules or pre-commitment outcomes (denoted by the
superscript R) and discretion or no-commitment outcomes (denoted by the
superscript D). With rules the individual governments and the common
central bank can be trusted not to use a surprise inflation tax to wipe out
the rcal value of government deficite. Private agente then believe what the
authorities announce about monetary policy and thus the expected rate of
inftation coincides with the actual rate of inflation. Furthermore, with rules
the national governments can minimise their welfare loss under the con-
straint a~ - x. The rules outcome then corresponds to the situation where
treasuries issue real or indexed bonds. With discretion governments cannot
be trusted to levy a surprise infiation tax. Hence, when they minimise their
welfare loss, they have to take the expected inflation rate as given. Of courae,
in rational expectations equilibrium expectations cannot be falsified so ex
post n~ - a must hold. In summary, there are tour outcomes: NR,CR, ND
and CD.
resources, arbittazy redisttibutions and fewer long-term contracta. An alternative juatifi-
cation of (7) ia given in Sectiona 6 and 8, whilat Sectioa 7 allows for a downward-sloping
money demand schedule.
8
3 Rules: Competition leads to excessive inflation
Here the rules outcomes are considered. A non-cooperative monetary union
leads under rules to
TNR -~ Q 1 xNR TNR - O, t- 1, ..., N,
mNJ
whilst a cooperative monetary union leads to




Fundamental properties of both the cooperative and the non-cooperative
outcomes are that conventional tax rates are smoothed over Lirne ( cf. Barro,
1979), that the common inflation rate is smoothed over time, and that tax
and seigniorage revenues must go up and down together (cf. Mankiw, 1987;
Grilli, 1989). The point is that the marginal distortions from the various
current and future sources of raising revenues must be equalised 4. There
is a trade-off between aiming for zero tax distortions and aiming for zero
inflation (or full liquidity) which leads in equilibrium to both positive tax
rates and positive inflation rates (cf. Phelps, 1973).
Since there is a common inflation rate throughout a monetary union, the
optimal rules of public finance require that the tax rates must be the same
throughout the region as well, even though levels of exhaustive government
spending and of government debt may vary írom country to country. Ob-
viously, this requires considerable solidarity in a monetary union. If there
are two countries, thc first with a higher Icvel of permanent government
spending and government debt and the second with a smaller need for gov-
ernment revenues (pdt f gP ~ pd2 ~ g2), the first country obtains more
~Thie tax-amoothing reault dependa on the rate of time pre[erence being the same as
the market rate of interest. lí governmenta [ace a atrictly poaitive probability o[ being
removed from o(fice, their rate of time preference may ezceed the intereet rate in which
case tax and in(lation ratea increase ove[ time. Short-aighted politiciana thue poatpone
[aising conventionaltax and aeigniorage revenuea.
seigniorage from the common central bank than the second country s. A
monetary union is thus only auatainable when countries with little need
for government revenues transfer revenues to countries with a greater need;
otherwise the fixity of nominal exchange rates is threatened. It can easily
be shown that when the costs of tax collection or, alternatively, the size
of the black economy are much larger in one country (smaller value of ~3),
tl~en tax rates are lower than the average and consequently the country also
receivea an implicit transfer of aeígniorage revenuea from the other coun-
tries. It is therefore understandable that both the Delors Report and the
Report of the European Commisaion recommend a convergence of levels of
government spending and debt. The distribution of seigniorage according to
need is otherwise the political price one has to pay for monetary unification.
Pessimists (or realists) might argue, of course, that such redistributions are
politically unlikely so that there is a danger that a monetary union wil] not
be established unless convergence in fiscal needs is achieved.
Upon substitution of equations (8) and (9) into the treasuries' present-
value budget constraints (2), one obtains a comparision of the non-cooperative
and cooperative outcomes under rules:
NN pd } yP - nm cR Pd -}. 9P - nm
x - ( (Q~mN) f m ) ~ x - ( (i~~m) -i. m
rorz PdtgP-nrn ca rPdt9P-nm
r -( 1 f (m2NIP) )
G r - 1 1~ (m2~Q)
(10)
where gP - (~j~t gP) ~N and d and r are defined similarly. An insight,
relevant for both the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes, is that
treasuries must raise conventional tax and seigniorage revenues for perma-
nent incteases in government spending and borrow for temporary increases
in government spending. For example, governments should borrow for in-
vestment projects with a market rate of return ( as they leave the permanent
level of exhaustive government spending, net of revenues from investment
'Within the context of a different model oí a monetary union with externalities, Casella
(1990) ehowa that a emall economy will in general obtain more than proportional power
in óhe cooperative agreement and thua will obtain a tranafer o[ seigniorage revenuee in
equilibrium.
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projects, unaffected but increase the actual level of spending). The size
of the outstanding average stock of government debt is irrelevant for the
size of the growth-corrected government deficits. The proportion of conven-
tional tax revenues increases when the aversion to inflation (p) increases or,
alternatively, when the costs of tax collection decrease.
Comparision of equations (8) and (9) shows that the marginal distortion
from the collection of seigniorage revenues is N times as large under the co-
operative as under the non-cooperative outcome. Absence of international
policy coordination means that each country fails to internalise the adverse
effects of grabbi~tg more seigniorage from the common central bank on the
other countries of the monetary union. Conflict between the national min-
istries oí finance thus leads to excessive monetary growth and inflation and
to too low conventional tax rates. For time-invariant paths of government
spending, it is easy to compare the welfare losses under the non-cooperative
and cooperative outcomes:
WNR ( r mN z ~
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as long as N 1 1 and ~3 ~ 0. Clearly, if pre-commitment to announced
policies is feasible, internationa] cooperation leads to lower monetary growth,
lower inflation, higher tax rates, and higher welfare.
4 Discretion: Policy coordination can be
counterproductive
Now the no-commitment or discretion outcomes are considered. Each gov-
ernment thus has to take as given that it cannot influence the expected
rate oí inflation through announcements about policy, as they would not be
believed by private agents. Equations (8) and (9) are then replaced by:
TND r Q xND rND - O, i- 1, ..., N (8')
- `mN f d; ~
11
rCD - ~ ~ 1 ,xCD T~D - 0, i - 1, . . . , N.
m}d;l
(9')
Intertemporal smoothing of tax and seigniorage revenues is still optimal.
Also, these two sources of revenues should still go up and down together.
The main difference with the rules (or pre-commitment) outcome is that
the marginal benefit of inflation has increased, because the ex-ante base for
raising seigniorage revenues now includes nominal government debt as well
as money balances. This is why the optimal proportion of conventional tax
to seigniorage revenues has decreased. The effects of this become clear upon
substition of equations (8') and (9') into (2) and imposing equilibrium:
xND Pd } gP - nm cD Pd } 9P - nm
- (m}~3I(mN}d)) ~x - (m}~3I(m~-d)
(10')
ND Pd } 9P - nm CD r Pd } gP - nm (,)
r -(1 } m(mN } d)IA)
G r - l 1} m(m } d)IA
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Note that, given absence of pre-commitment, non-cooperation leads to ex-
cessive inflation and to too low tax rates. The presence of an outstanding
stock oC nominal government debt is an open invitation to wipe it out with an
unanticipated inflation tax. Since in tlie absence of pre-commitment govern-
ments cannot be trusted not to take up the invitation, inflation and seignior-
age revenues are higher under discretion than under rules (7rND
,.xNR and
xCD ) ACR if d 1 0). This must mean, of course, that conventional tax
rates are lower when pre-commitment to announced monetazy policies is
not feasible (r"'D C 7NR and r~D G r~R if d~ 0). As fai as treasuries
are concerned, lack of monetary discipfine and competition between govern-
ments (ND) is excellent as this reduces conventional tax distortions more
than any other outcome. However, as fas as central bankers are concerned,
Lhis is the worst outcome because it increases inflation more than any other
outcome. It is clear that central bankers are most happy when there is an
excellent monetary discipline and international policy coordination (CR)
because then inflation is lower than in any other outcome. Thie seems to
capture in a nutshell the conflict between ministers of finance and central
bankers.
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If the monetary authorities do not have a high enough reputation and
cannot pre-commit to announced policiea, it is possible that macroeconomic
policy coordination within a monetary union can be counterproductive. Pre-
viously such a counterintuitive result has been obtained for a regime ot
floating exchange rates when the monetary authorities are tempted to use
surprise inflation to either erode the real value oí predetermined nominal
wages and boost employment (Rogoff, 1985) or to use the seigniorage rev-
enues thus obtained to reduce distortionary taxes and increase spending on
public goods (van der Plceg, 1988). Under floating exchange rates cooper-
ation destroys monetary discipline and leads to higher inflation and lower
welfare, because an unanticipated monetary expansion no longer inducea a
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and an increase in consumers'
prices. International policy coordination leads to the disappearance of this
disincentive tu levy a surprise inflation tax, because when all countries re-
nege simultaneously the nominal exchange rate is unafiected. In a monetary
union international policy coordination can also be counterproductive, but
the explanation is a bit more subtle as exchange rates are fixed. The follow-
ing counter-example makes the point.
Assume that the government run up assets equal to the stock of money
balances, d--m. It then follows that aCD - ~~ xND rcD - pd f ga -
nm ~ TND and WCD -(~ó)(pd t gP - nm)~. It is straightforward to show
that then WcD 1 WND holds it the inequality ,Q(N - 3) C m~(N - 1)
holds. Sufficient conditions for the CD-outcome to be worse than the ND-
outcome, given that d--m, are N- 2, N - 3 or ~3 C m~. Macroeconomic
policy coordination can, under certain circumstances, woraen monetary dis-
cipline and be counterproductive. This perverse result is more likely to
occur when the advantage of international cooperation in the form of lower
inflation ia outweiglicd by the disadvantage of more tax distortions (low (i)
and when the number of countriea is small. The counter-example can best
be understood by thinking of a clever scheme for restructuring government
debt which eliminatea the incentives for unanticipated inflation in the co-
operative outcome: hold a stock of nominal bonds bought from the public
equal to the private sector holdings of real money balances so that when a
government reneges, it looses just as much on its assets as it gains on real
money balances. In the non-cooperative outcome there is still an incentive
to renege leading to higher inftation, but this may be desirablc when thc
coste of tax collection are high enough.
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5 The case for an independent common central
bank
Moat practitioners advocate that a central bank should be independent and
íree of political pressure. Its sole objective should be directed at maintaining
price stability. One way of thinking about an independent central bank is
that it is staffed by ultra-conservative central bankers who act as an agent for
the government and give an infinite weight to the objective of price stability.
The optimal public-finance rules for a monetary union with an independent
common central bank (denoted by the superscript I) are given by x~ - 0
and i;~ - 0, i- 1, ..., N. Upon substitution into the present-value budget
constraints, one obtaina
r; -pd;fg;-nm, i-1,...,N. (13)
An independent common central bank achieves a stable price level, which
means that the ministries of finance need to resort to higher tax rates than
would be the case when they have a say in the running of the central bank.
If the various governments enjoy the trust of private agents, they can pre-
commit and it can easily be shown that WI ) WNR ) yyCR Hence, if
policies are credible, the lowest welfare loss is achieved when the various
ministers ot finance coordinate their budgetary and monetary policies and
the highest welfare loss occurs when there is an independent common central
bank. The reason is, ot course, that an independent bank leads to a sub-
optimal government revenue mix.
Why then do practitioners advocate an independent central bank? Why
dces the Delors Report recommend an independent European System of
Central Banks based on the German model? The main reason is that they
do not trust that treasuriea have sufficient monetary discipline to guarantee
pricc stability, becausc tbcy forever havc the temptation to levy an unan-
ticipated inflation tax in order to finance additional spending, ot to ac-
commodate demand for higher wages. Practitioners believe that only an
independent common central bank, directed by ultra-conservative central
bankers who only care about price stability, will not be tempted to use a
surprise inftation tax to wipe out the real value of outstanding nominal gov-
ernment debt (cf. Gros, 1988), the real value ofpredetermined nominal wage
contracts (cf. Barro and Gordon, 1983) or the real value of money balances
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(cf. Calvo, 1979; Barro, 1983). Whenever the central bank dces give in to
such temptationa, equilibrium inflation will be higher and tax rates will be
lower. Since ministers of finance, trade unions and others anticipate that
an independent central bank is not going to give in to their demands, they
settlc for less and as a result inflation is lower and tax rates are higher.
Undoubtedly, this is the reason why central bankers ( the main signatories
of the Delors Report) are so much in favour of an independent EuroFed.
In the light of the above discussion, it is much more relevant to com-
pare non-cooperative arrd cooperative outcomes under disr.retion, which is
relevant when ministers of finance have a say in the running of the cen-
tral bank, with the outcome which prevails under an independent common
central bank. To assess the case for an independent common central bank,
one should therefore trade-off the disadvantage of a sub-optimal government
revenue mix againat the advantage of excellent monetary discipline and the
lower inflation this brings with it. The condition under which an inde-
pendent common central bank (I) yields higher welfare than a cooperative
monetary union which is unable to pre-commit (CD) is given by
((j - m~)d(m ~ d) 1 (~3 - } m~)m(m ~ d) (14)
whilst the condition under which one prefers an independent common cen-
tral bank over a non-cooperative monetary union with a dependent central
banking system (ND) is given by
(~3 - m~)d ~ [,Q(2 - N) } Nm~]m. (15)
Inequality (14) suggests that one is more likely to come out strongly in favour
of an independent common central bank rather than a cooperative monetary
union when the stock of outstanding nominal government debt is high, when
the priority governments attach to the elimination of inflation rather than
tax distortions is high, and when the size of thc underground economy is
smalL Inequality (15) is more (less) likely to be violated as the number of
members of the monetary union increases, provided that ~i exceeds ( is less
than) mz. In other words, when the priority one attaches to price stability
exceeds the priority one attaches to the elimination of tax distortions and
the number of inembers is large, one always prefers an independent common
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central bauk to a non-cooperative monetary union with a dependent central
banking system.
Italy has a larger black economy and a less efficient tax system (lower
~i) than Germany and should therefore find it optimal to extract relatively
more revenues from seigniorage than (rom conventional taxation (cf. Can-
zoneri and Rogers, 1990). Some even azgue that such differentials in the
need for public revenues provide a good case against the EMU and an argu-
ment in favour of a crawling peg between the currencies of r~orthern and of
southern Europe as this would accommodate the required inflation differen-
tial (e.g. Dornbusch, 1988). However, this argument completely ignores the
monetary discipline the Bundesbank gives to the Banca d'Italia under the
EMS (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). The same point applies to the EMU: the
EuroFed should provide the monetary discipline which the central banks of
some member states may otherwise lack. The gain in central bank credibil-
ity and the accompanied tying of one's hands may be the main advantage
of the EMS, and hopefully of the EuroFed and the EMU as well. This ad-
vantage of a strong Bundesbank in the EMS and an independent EuroFed
is particularly relevant for countries with a large stock of outstanding nomi-
nal government debt, such as Italy and the Netherlands, and with a greater
preference for low inttation than for getting rid of tax distortions (Gros,
1988)-
There is a danger that, as Europe moves from the EMS towards the
EMU, the Getman hegemony in monetary policy is weakened and conse-
quently the discipline of the Bundesbank is diluted. Although the Delors
Report envisages the EuroFed to be modelled on the Bundesbank and have
an independent status, one may throw away the baby with the bath water:
as central bankers of weaker members of the EMU get votes in the running
of the EuroFed, the monetary discipline of the EMU may be weakened.
6 Private consumption and unemployment
So far, the analysis has stressed the effects of unanticipated inflation on wip-
ing out the rcal value of debt service and of nominal government debt. The
effects of unanticipated inftation on output and unemployment has received
a lot of attention in the New Classical literature and in the literature on
rules versus discretion (e.g. Barro and Gordon, 1983). Giavazzi and Pagano
(1988) havc applied this literature to explain that countríes may wish to join
the EMS and peg their currencies to the Deutschemark in order to enjoy
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the excellent anti-inflation and discipline of the Bundesbank. The purpose
of this section is to integrate this literature into a model of tax~seigniorage
smoothing and to emphasise the merits of an independent EuroFed for the
EMU.
6.1 Aggregate supply, unanticipated inflation and the tax
wedge
Aggregate supply of goods is given by the following schedule:
log(Q;) - log(Q;) - ~o - ~tr; f ~(A - x`), i - 1,...,N, (fs)
where Q; denotes the actual level ofoutput, and Q; denotes the full-employment
level of output of country i. There is no labour mobility, so one can write
the unemployrnent rate (u;) as
u á); - Q; oe ~o i- ~tT; -~t(7r - rr`), i- 1,..., N. (16')
- ( Q;
An increase in the tax rate drives a wedge between the producers' and
consumers' wage, hence reduces the incentive to work and produce. Conse-
quently, aggregate supply falls and the rate of unemployment rises. Frictions
in the labour market (~ ~ 0) also cause the equilibrium level of output to
fall short of the full-employment level of output. Given absence of ex-ante
indexation of wages, a surprise increase in inflation erodes the real value of
the predetermined nominal wage and thus boosts employment and aggregate
supply. Output is assumed to be perishable and cannot be used as capital
for use in future production.
Aggregate demand for goods in country i consists of private consump-
tion, C; and government spending, G;. Equilibrium in the goods markets
can be written aa e
óStrictly epea4ing, the diRerence between the Lef4hand and right-hand xide of (17)




where K(a, ,) denotes a strictly convex function capturing the reduction
in production efficiency (or the dead-weight losses) arising from the ex-
traction of non-monetary taxes and seigniorage revenues (cf. Obstfeld,
1990). It satisfies K(0, 0) - aw(0, 0)~aa - aK(0, 0)~a,- 0. Since the
non-monetary tax system is not always indexed, a and r may affect K(.)
in a non-separable fashion. The loss in production efficiency is proportional
to the full-employment level ofoutput. Combining equations (16) and (17),
one obtains the following expression for the full-employment national income
shares of private consumption:
~i-~C~~-1-Y'U-W]ritW6~~-Ae)-K(R.ri)-9i~ (18)
`Q i
where g; - G;~Q;, i- 1,...,N.
The governments of the countries making up the monetary union choose
their budgetary policies to finance their required levela of present and future
exhaustive government spending and to maximise welfare functions of the
form:
where f, denotes the ratio oí net [oreign asseta to the full-employment level of output in
country i. Since households use the current account to emooth private conaumption, (18)
should really be given by
Li - r:f: t 1- WO - W1TP t Wa(~P - x~P) - KP(x~ r:) - 9~,
However, as the governmenta find it optimal to emooth taz and inflation rates, one has
c:-r.f:tl-~a-~ir,tma(x-z~)-K(x,r:)-9p, i-1,...,N
which reduces to (18) when one assumes that the national income sharea ot exhaustive
government spending are constant and that initial holdings of foreign assets aze zero.
I8
w; -~~eXP(-(Pt n)t)[C;(t) - 2 T~u;(t)zQ;(t)Idt, i- 1,...,N. (19)
If the cost function K(. ) is assumed to separable and quadratic, ~c(.) -
zKtr; t~nzaz and Q;~~; - n, i- I,...,N, the reduced-form welfare
functions can be written as:
W~ - ~~ eXP(-Pt)[I - ~o - ~ir;(t) f ~1(x(t) - ~e(t)) - rlKlri(t)2
-2KZ~(t)z - 9;(t) - 2 r[iu;(t)z]dt, i - 1,...,N. (19')
The welfate-loss function (7), employed in Sections 2-5, is equivalent to the
welfaze function ( 19'), if one abstracts from the effects of the tax wedge and
unanticipated inflation on aggregate supply (~1 - Qt2 - 0), ignores the ef-
fects ofunemployment on welfare (r~ - 0), and defines ~3 - rcz~Kl. In general,
social welfare corresponds to maximising the present value of private con-
sumption minus the present value of costs associated with unemployment.
Since unemployment is one of the main reasons for economic inequality,
this seems the easiest way to allow for both efticiency and eyuity considera-
tions. The costs of unemployment are quadratic in the unemployment rate
and proportional to the full-employment level of output ~. This quadratic
term facilitates a comparison with the previous literature on unanticipated
inflation and employment (Barro and Gordon, 1983).
There is an additional policy problem, because the presence of tax wedges
and frictions in the labour market (~ f~lr) implies that the equilibrium
level of output is insufficient to employ all members of the labour force. The
govenuuent ia tlwn tempted Lo use unanticipaled inflation tu fight unetn-
ployment. SucL a policy must in the long run always be in vain, so that
in rational-expectations equilibrium one must end up with higher inflation.
A first-best policy is to eridicate the labour-market distortions directly, i.e.
use structural labour-market policies to drive dao down to zero, because then
this motive for unanticipated inflation disappeare. Such a first-best policy
'lt ia etraightforward to allow for a lineaz term in uaemployment, eay -~b'u;Q;, becauee
then eRectively the ~; aze replaced by ~;(1 t 1~')~ ~- 0,1,2. If one valuea leiaure rather
than penaliaen unemployment, ~G' is negative and the m; become amaller.
ls
provides amcnunition against the familiar positive theories of inflation (e.g.
Barro and Gordon, 1983), because one can legitimately argue that structural
labour-market policies aze a much better response to fighting unemployment
than unanticipated inflation. However, if one integrates the positive "screw-
up" theories of inflation with the public-finance theories of tax~seigniorage
smoothing, it is optimal to have some unemployment in equilibrium because
distortionary taxes are required to finance a given etream of government
spending. This means that, even if ~o - 0, there is an incentive left for
unanticipated inflation in the fight against unemployment as long as ~ is
not zero.
6.2 Three motives for unanticipated inflation
In the present model there are thus three independent motives for unantici-
pated inRation: (i) to wipe out the real value of debt service (as discussed in
Sections 4 and 5); (ii) to wipe out the real value of nominal wage contracts
and thus fight unemployment; and (iii) to raise output and provide more
resources for private consumption. The analysis of Sections 3-5 can be re-
peated for this more generalised model. In order not to go into unnecessary
detail, attention is restricted to the cooperative outcomes under rules and
discretion and to the outcome under an independent common centtal bank.
The CR-outcome yields
~CR
(Q - rc~(1 f rG~i) f~r(1 f~G~o), r~R - 0, i- 1,...,N, (20)
` m
so tax~seigniorage revenues are smoothed and go up and down together
as usual. Comparing (20) with (9), it is clear that the marginal cost of
taxation has gone up due to the adverse effects on aggregate supply and
thus on private consumption and the rate of unemployment. This is why
governments find it optimal to levy relatively more seigniorage revenues and




where k- d t~gPónm~ denotes the region's average level of government
20
commitments. It is easy to ahow that, if ~r - 0, welfaze under the optimal
CR-outcome follows from:
p1,ycR - I - ~o - 2~G~o - 9P - 2 `A ~m~~
(Pk)~. (22)
Note that, as before, a high level of government commitments reduces wel-
fate. Also, a high level o[ government spending reduces welfare directly,
because it crowds out private consumption. A higher stock of real money
balances, which is willingly held by private agents, give rise to more seignior-
age revenues and thus requires less tax distortions and boosts welfare. The
presence of frictions on the labour market (db) reduces output and thus
leaves less room íor private consumption and increases unemployment, so
reduces welfare.
If the governments do not have the trust of private agents, the discretion
outcome is appropriate:
~(~) - (~) (I t ~u~) `1m m ~ c TCD(I i' ~~1) f ~1(I ~~~0) (20~)
1 ~ (d;~m)
Comparing (20') with (20), one notices three additional effects in the left-
hand side of (20'). Each one of them depresses the marginal cost of in0ation
and in equilibrium leads to a higher rate of inflation. They correspond to
the three motives for unanticipated inflation discussed above. Non-monetary
tax rates and monetary growth rates go up and down together as usual, but
under discretion ari increase in the tax rate must go up with a more than
equiproportionate increase in monetary growth. Combined with the fixed
bias towards using monetary growth, it is cleaz that in Figure 1 the locus
describing (20') is steeper than the one describing (20) and also that (20')
cuts the vertical axis above (20). Intersection with the present-value govern-
ment budget constraint (CIIC), t-} Bm - pk, yields the optimal government
revenue mix.
Insert Figure 1: Effects of higher government comrnitments under rules and
discretion.
Discretion yields higher monetary growth, inflation and nominal interest
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rates and consequently lower tax rates than rules. A permanent increase in
government commitments shifts out the GBC-locus and leads to higher tax
rates and higher monetary growth,but under discretion there is relatively
a greaterincrease in seigniorage revenues. Algebraically, one finds:




and thus acD ) xcn `Upon substitution of (20') and (21'), one finds (for
~i - 0) the corresponding level of welfare:
pl;ycD - 1 - ~o - 2t~~ó - gp
-1 ~ [1 ~ ( ,n
r d
~~l (pk)2 f 2P ~~~ (1 i- ~G~o)dk f ~ !~~ (1 f rG~o)2 ~1 f lpZ~~
2 ~- [l ~ lm A}d IJ2
C PWCR- (22~)
Welfare is lowet under discretion than under rules because there are two
good reasons why lack of credibility forces governments to rely on a sub-
optimal revenue mix: (i) outstanding stocks of nominal government debt
(d 1 0); ( ii) predetermined nominal wage contracts (~ ~ 0). The second
reason gives rise to an incentive to use unanticipated inflation to boost pri-
vate consumption and to cut unemployment. The presence of structural
labour-market imperfections (~ 1 0) reinforces these reasons for unantic-
ipated inflation and depresses welfare under discretion even more. Since
unanticipated inflation affects unemployment and private consumption, dis-
cretion yields higher inflation than rules even when all government bonds
are indexed.
6.3 The case for an independent common central bank re-
visited
If there is an independent common central bank whose sole task it is to
maintain price stability, seigniorage occurs only through real growth and
one has aI - 0, L~ - pk 1 tCR ) tCD and
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pW~ - 1 -~u - 2tG~ó - 9'~ - 2(pk)a L pWr:r~ ('l3)
Since an independent central bank clearly has a sub-optimal revenue mix, it
leads to lower welfare than a cooperative monetary union with a sound mon-
etary discipline. However, a more relevant comparison is with a cooperative
monetary union with a dependent central banking system which does not
have the benefit of sound monetary discipline. In that case a second-best
institutional set-up, such as an independent common central bank, may well
be preferable. In fact, if ~1 -~- 0, this is the case when ( 14) is satisfied.
Clearly, an autonomous central bank is preferred when the production losses
arising from conventional taxes are much less than those arising from infla-
tion (e.g. when there is no substantial underground economy) and when the
outstanding stock of nominal government debt is high.
In the extreme case that there are no production losses or adverse supply
effects from taxation (~r - Kr - 0), one always prefers an independent
central bank even if one allows for the effects of unanticipated inflation on
aggregate supply (~ ~ 0):
`~z 2 ~ 0.pWi - p1;ycD - py~ca - pyyco - 2 (K~~ (1 } ~G~o)
s
(14')
The point is that the presence ofpredetermined nominal wage contra.cts pro-
vides an incentive to use a surprise inflation tax for a boost to employment
and private consumption, so that in the absence of an autonomous monetary
authority in(tation must in equilibriurn bc higher and taxes must bc lower
(~cD - (~z.) (I } rG~o) ~ ~r - 0 Tco - pk - ~~~ (1 } TG~o) G T~ - pk).
Since the`re are no production losses arising from non-monetary taxes, one
always preÏers an independent central bank. Note that, in contrast to Barro
and Gordon (1983), the present argument doea not require the presence of
frictions in the labour market for a positive explanation of inftation.
If there are no production losses from taxation and the government does
not have unemployment as an explicit target (Kt - r(i - 0) but the tax
wedge and unanticipated inftation do affect output and private consumption
(~i, ~~ 0), one also has excessive inftation (ac~ -[~t(m-~d)}~2]~KZ ~ 0)
and a lower tax rate (rcD - pk - mxcD C r~). It is straightforward to
23
show that, when the effects of unanticipated inflation are much larger than
the effects of the tax wedge on aggregate supply and when the outstanding
stock of nominal government is high, i.e. when the inequality
~id f rbz 1 ~im (14~~)
is satisfied, one prefers an independent common central bank to a coopera-
tive monetary union with a dependent central banking system.
7 Expected inflation and the demand for money
The problems oí time inconsistency which arose in Sections 2-6 can be
avoided if governments issue real or indexed bonds and wage contracts con-
tain indexation clauses. I{owever, the analysis in these sections has adopted
the quantity theory of money and thus assumed that the velocity of circu-
lation in each country is constant. It is more realistic to assume that the
demand for money in each country is a negative function of the nominal
interest rate:
m- r(x`) - 7oexpl-1'i(P f A`)~, I'~ G 0, (24)
where ry denotes the serni-elasticity of money demand with respect to the
nominal interest rate. Note that this formulation of money demand implies
a unit income elasticity and no wealth effects. Thia formulation allows for
time inconsistaicy problems, even now it is assumed that governments issue
debt with a guaranteed real rate ot return (r; - p) and wage contracts are
indexed (~ - 0). For simplicity, the effects of the tax wedge on aggregate
supply are ignored from now on (~1 - 0) so that aggregate supply and the
rate of unemployment aze exogenous. It is cleaa that, maximising (19) or
(19') is then equivalent to minimising the welfare loss (7) and that the three
motives for unanticipated inflation discussed in Section 6 disappear.
However, governments now have an incentive to use an unanticipated
increase in the price level as this wipes out the real va7ue of money holding
at the "stroke of a pen". This classical problem azises because money dces
not bear a rate of return: "An issue of notes is a manifest gain to the issuers,
who, until the notes are returned for payment, obtain the use of them as if
they were a real capital ... all holders of currency lose, by the depreciation of
its value, the exact equivalent of what the issuer gains" (Mill, 1848, Book 3,
Chapter 8, Section 4) and "The burden of the (inflation) tax is well spread,
cannot be evaded, costs nothing to collect, and falls, in a rough sort of
way, in proportion to the wealth of the victim. No wonder its superficial
advantages have attracted Ministers of finance ... it seems possible to please
and content the public, for a time at least, by giving them, in return for taxes
they pay, finely engraved acknowledgements on watermazked paper ... The
higher the toll and the tax, the less traffic on the roads, and the less business
ttansacted, so also the less money carried" (Keynes, 1923, pp. 39, 43, 53).
It is clear from these two quotes that the demand for money should depend
on the opportunity cost oi holding money. The use of capital levies versus
the use of currency depreciation were discussed by Keynes in great detail.
In modern theories of public finance, one wonders why people hold money in
the first place when it is clear that they cannot necessarily trust governments
not to impose a capital levy of this type.
Instead of equation (4), equation (24) implies
~e(t) - `7r I ~~(t) f n - B(t)) (4~)
which upon integration yields
x(t) - ` 1~ J~~,xp l- `v-t I J
B`(v, t)dv - n (4")
7t ~ 7~
where f7`(v,t) denotes the expectation of B(v) held at time t. The rate
of inflation now depends on expectations about future monetary growth,
hence both a and m should now be treated as non-predetermined, forwazd-
looking variables. The rules outcome is obtained by minimising the welfare
loss function (7) subject to equations (1'), (3) and (4') under the assumption
that a` - n. It is a straightforward exercise to show that this yields
~NR
~l - 71(P f
~NR } n)7TNR - Q1 NT(x~,R) ' - 0, i - 1,..., N (25)
for the non-cooperative outcome, and
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xCR
(1 - 71~P f xCR -} n)]7CR c ~P ACR , 1;CR c ~, {- 1,...,~V ~2Ó~
for the cooperative outcome. Discretion implies that governments have in-
sufficient credibility to influence expectations, sogovernments minimise their
welfare losses taking the expected inflation rate as given s. This yields
~ND
rND - NI'(trND)'
rND - O, 2- 1,..., N (25')
for the non-cooperative outcome, and
A~cr~ cD ~
rcD - T~ApD~, ri - ~, i- 1, ..., N (26 )
for the cooperative outcome. The departure from the quantity theory of
money, followed in this section, implies that in each of the four outcomes the
optimal inflation rate is lower and the optimal tax rate is higher than before,
because governments now take account of citizens economising on holdings
of money when the monetary growth and inflation increase. The insight
that absence of international policy coordination induces central banks to
appropriate too much seigniorage revenues and thus leads to too high in-
flation rates and to too low tax rates (xcD ~~ND
~CR ~ ANR~ iemainó
unaltered. The main additional insight is that competitive decision making
leads to an erosion of the base for raising seigniorage revenues 9, so that tax
rates do not fall as much as they would otherwise.
More interesting is perhaps that one can show that absence of monetary
discipline reduces the costs of higher inflation, as governments realise they
are unable to influence expectations and thus unable to affect the demand
gIn fact, this impliea somewhat naive behaviour of private agenta becauee they might
uae the level of outstanding government commitmenta to forecast inflation and the gov-
ernment ahould in a dynamic environment take euch a torecaet tunction rather than the
expected rate o[ inflation as given. Section e explores theae ieauea in more detail.
vln [act, Aizenman (]989), who doea not addreae the isaue of monetary discipline,
arguea that thia erosion o[ the inflation-tax base may even put the monetary union on the
wrong aide of the aeigniorage-Laffer curve.
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tor money and the base for raising seigniorage revenues, and thus leads in
equilibrium to higher inflation and lower tax rates (xCD , xca xND )
xNR). Although it is a bit more messy, the analysis of Section 5 can be
repeated to show that it is desirable to have an independent common central
bank when the benefits of lower inflation and enhanced discipline outweigh
the disadvantages of more tax distortions. It is straightforward to show that
the stronger the effect of nominal interest rates and expected inflation on
money demand, the stronget the case for an independent central bank.
The above results may not be robust to the specification of money de-
mand. For example, if there are only two assets, viz. money and bonds,
and the portfolio shazes (m;~(m; d- d;)) depend only on the relative return
of these two assets, i.e. expected inflation, the optimal steady-state infla-
tion rate for a closed-economy (and thus for a cooperative monetary union)
is determined by the full liquidity rule in the sense that nominal interest
rates are driven to zero (~rnovsky and Brock, 1980; Yashiv, 1989). In that
case inflation and tax rates do not go up and down together anymore and
there is no permanent need for international policy coordination in a mon-
etazy union without an independent central bank. The results thus depend
heavily on the exact specification of the effect of expected inflation on the
demand for money. It therefore seems worthwile to proceed with a properly
specified model of the ongoing strategic interactions between governments
and private agents.
8 Micro foundations of monetary policy games
The analysis of Sections 2-7 did not benefit from a fully specified model of
monetary policy games with micro foundations. There is a danger that
some of the results do not carry over to a fully specified model of the
ongoing strategic interactions betweem optimising governments and a ra-
tional private sector in which one distinguishes between pre-commitment
and Markov-perfect equilibria. Calvo (1978) has already shown that dis-
cretion, i.e. lack of pre-commitment, in the face of the temptation to tax
cash money balances through unanticipated inflation induces higher inflation
than under rules, whereas the tax~seigniorage smoothing literature argues
that inflation, whatever its current level, is persistent. In a very interesting
paper Obstfeld (1991b) shows that, when one restricts attention to Markov-
períect equilibria ín which governments cannot commit to pre-announced
monetary policies, the familiar result from public finance that it is optimal
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to smooth seigniorage revenues and inflation rates no longer holds. Instead,
Obstfeld argues that under discretion the optimal inflation rate falls over a
time towards the socially preferred full liquidity rule. Hence, a permanent
increase in government spending inducea a temporary bout in inflation and
seigniorage revenues which permits the government to retire debt, reduce the
burden of debt service and make room for the higher level of spending. This
is in sharp contrast to the Ramsey principle of optimal taxation, stressed
by the tax~seigniorage smoothing approach, which argues that both the tax
rate and the inflation rate jump upwards and stay at the higher levels in
response to a permanent increase in government apending. Obstfeld pre-
sented his analysis in discrete time, which allows a cazeful specification of
the sequence of moves in the dynamic game. Here the analysis is conducted
in continuous time and applied within the context of a monetary union.
8.1 Markov-perfect equilibrium
Assume that the labour market functions perfectly, that debt and wage
contracts are indexed to the price level and that there is no real growth
(r; - p, ~i -~t - n- 0). The representative household in country i
maximises its utility function,
U;(i) - J ~ exp[-p(v - t)][c;(v) } í t(m;(v))]dv, (27)
i
subject to its budget constraint,
d;-Pat}1-~o-K(A,T;)-c~-rt-(P}A`)m„ (2g)
where a; denotes the tatio of private asset holdings to income in country
i, i- 1, ..., N. Households take the tax and inflation rates as given.
The linearity of utility in consumption fixes the equilibrium real interest
rate at the pure rate of time preference (p). The function S2(.) captures
the transactions services from holding real money balances and is twice
continuously diflerentiable, increasing and strictly concave for positive m.
Alternatively, low levels of money demand associated with high inflation
inducc "shoe-leathcr" welfare costs. Ilouseholds set the marginal utility
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equal to the opportunity cost of holding real money balances, i.e. S2'(m;) -
p f x`. This yields the money demand function m- F(x`), r' G 0. For
example, if S2(m) -(-1) [log(yo) -~ 1- log(m)~ with m C ryo, one obtains
equation (24) with a constant semi-elasticity ofmoney demand with respect
to the nominal interest rate.
Households predict the inflation rate using information on the average
outstanding level of government commitments:
x` - F(k), m- P(F(k)) - M(k), F' ~ 0, M' - F'F" C 0 (29)
where F(.) denotes the forecast function. The intuition is that, when the
level of commitments is high, the central bank requires more seigniorage
revenues and consequently private agents forecast a higher inílation rate
and hold less money balances. The equilibrium satisfies the Markov prop-
erty, because households only use present and not past levels of government
commitments to forecast ínflation (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986). An
important assumption underlying the present analysis is that private agents
do not use information on the current tax rate and current rate of monetary
growth in making their forecast of inflation. In this sense, the government
has lost most of its leadership role. This seems reasonable in a continuous-
time analysis of credible policies.
The household budget constraint, (28), is implied by the condition for
equilibrium in the goods market, (18), the condition for equilibrium in the
money market, r'rt -(B - x)m, the condition for equilibrium in the bonds
market, a- m- d, and the government budget constraint, (1) or, alterna-
tively, k- pk - r-Bm.
As in Section 7, attention is restricted to a cooperative monetary union so
that effectively there is one government which maximises the region's welfare
function. If V(k) denotes the value function of the regional government, it
is clear that the optimal policy for the region follows from the Bellman
equation of dynamic programming to:
N r l
pV(k) - M,a.ex ~~ S 1 - ~o - 2 rctT~ - 2KZ [B - ( M~k~ ) (Pk - r - BM(k))] Z - 9i1(-i l
~"For simplicity, attention ie reetricted to etalionary Markov-perfecl cyuilibria so tbat
time is omitted as an argument.
29
}NSt(M(k)) f NV'(k) (pk - r - BM(k)]) . (30)
This yields the following first-order conditions:
~c~xr; - (M(k)Kl - r, i - 1,...,N
K2x[1 t M'(k)] - -V'(k)M(k)
where the rate of inflation is given by
(31)
(32)
~r - B[1 t M'(k)] -~ M~(k) ~(Pk - r). (33)
F,quation (31) is the familiar condition which says that intratemporal marginal
distortions from the various sources of raising revenues must be equalised,
i.e. for a given level of government commitments the optimal tax rate and
the optimal inflation rate must go up and down together. However, if the
level of government commitments is high, expected inflation is high and con-
sequently the ratio of money balances to income is low and the ratio of the
optimal tax rate to the optimal inflation rate is high. Equations (31)-(33)
can be solved to give r; - T(k), i- 1,..., N, x - II(k) and B- O(k).
Etational expectations requires that forecasts of private agents are correct:
a` - F(k) - II(k). (34)
The resulting equilibrium must ensure that private agents accurately
forecast government policies in equilibrium, that the markets for goods,
money and bonds clcar, that the present-value budget constraints of private
agents and of governments are satisfied, and that the government policy rules
for the tax rate and rate of monetary growth for a given level of commit-
ments take account of the behaviour of aggregate money demand induced by
priw'ate decision rules. More formally, the equilibrium consists of a forecast
schedule for inflation, F(k), an aggregate demand schedule for real money
balances, M(k), a monetazy growth rule, 0(k), a tax rule, T(k), and a rule
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for inflation, II(k), such that: (i) B- O(k) and r- T(k) maximise social
welfaze subject to the government budget constraint for all 1 and all possible
k(0) given m- M(k); (ii) m- M(k) maximises household utility for all t
and all possible k(0) given x` - F(k); and (iii) x- II(k) is calculated from
(33) given B- O(k),r - T(k) and m- M(k), and must equal F(k) for
all k. An attractive property of the feedback policy rules thus obtained is
that they are optimal and credible even when the economy deviates from
the equïlibrium path.
8.2 Temporary bouts of inflation and taxation
Followimg Obstfeld (1991b), it seems worthwhile to construct a simple linear
example which drops S2(m) from the social welfare function and replaces the
production-losses function K(a,r) by K(á,r), where inflation-tax payments
are defined as ir - am. In addition, the utility households derive from
holding real money balances is given by fi(m) - y(mplog(m) - m] where
mp denotes Friedman's optimum quantity of money as !2'(mp) - 0(cf. van
der Ploeg, 1988). For simplicity, only one country is considered.
A lincat aggregate tnoncy demand schedule, M(k) - po - p~k, where
{ro, Irl 1 0, is postulated, so that inflation-tax payments can with the aid
of the government budget constraint be written as
á-B-in.-(1-pl)9i-I~i(pk-r). (33')
Performing the maximisation in the Bellman equation with respect to r
and B yields Kir - K27r --~~~~ )(cf. equations (31)-(32)). Postulate
a quadratic value function, V(`k) - vo .{- vtk - zv2k2, and substitute this
together with the optimal rules for r and à into the Bellman equation:
z
P(votv~k-2vZk )-1-~o-9t2 (K tK
(ul-vkl
~ ` t s~`'-{~i I
} p (v~ - v2k)k. (30')
1-p~
The Bellman equation must hold for all values of k, so equating ccefficients
on k and k~ ields v 2- ''~"~ Ty~ t- 0 and v ~Z . It follows that ~p) - à-
( ~~ ) pk - F(k) where ~3 - K2~Kt.
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Households maximise utility and set the marginal utility equal to the
opportunity cost of holding money balances, so m-(P~,rx`). Rational
expectations requires that á~ - F(k), so that in equilibrium
m- P} ry - M(k) - Iro - l~tk (34~)
`rymF - ~1'} ~ Pk~
must hold tor all k. tlence, ~so -(p~) mp and pt - p~[(p t ry)Q -1. ry] so
that the optimal tax rate and level of inflation-tax payments must satisfy:
A- xM -`(P t)P t 7) Pk
(35)
where the superscript M denotes Markov-perfect equilibrium. It also follows
from the government budget constraint that
M - - PZ k(~) - ko (36)
k qk' n-(7(Q f 1) t P(A- 1)
,
A characterisation of this Markov-perfect equilibrium is now possible. In
steady state the government does not levy taxes or extract inflation-tax pay-
ments from the private sector (r(oo) - à(oo) - 0). Instead, the government
builds up assets to generate just enough interest payments to finance the
permanent level of government spending (k(oo) - 0). The steady-state stock
of real money balances lies below Friedman's optimum quantity of money
(m(oo) - (o~)mp G mF). The policy of retiring government debt and
building up assets equal to the present value of future government spending
ensures that in steady state there is no need to supplement the budget and
consequently there are no production efficiency losses arising from taxation
or inflation.
To understand the dynamics of the equilibrium, consider a permanent in-
crease in government spending ( k(0) jumps írom zero to a positive amount).
It follows that inflation-tax payments and the tax rate jump up immedi-
ately to a higher level than is required to finance the increase in government
spending with a balanced budget. The additional revenues are used to build
up assets. As this is done, taxes and inflation-tax payments fall and eventu-
ally disappear when enough assets have been built up to finance the increase
in government spending.
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8.3 Comparison with pre-commitment equilbrium
The pre-commitment or rules outcome is derived in the usual fashion:
`Pt7~ (Q ) - rR-BR- `(Pt7)Af7~PkGirM, (35~)
so that it relies relatively more on non-monetary taxes than inflation-tax
payments, and also gives rise to the familiar random walk property of taxes
and inflation-tax payments, iR - xR - kR - 0. A consequence is that in
the pre-commitment equilibrium the government only borrows for temporary
increases in spending dR - g-gP. Note that, for a given level of government
commitments, the tax rate is the same in the pre-commitment and in the
no-commitment equilibrium, rM - rR for a given k.
Insert Figure 2: Temporary bouts of inftation and taxation
Figure 2 compares what happens under the Mazkov-perfect equilibrium
story and the traditional tax~seigniorage smoothing story. Note that tax~-
seigniorage smoothing occurs as a degenerate special case of the Markov-
perfect equilibrium when money demand does not depend on expected in-
ffation (y -. oo, m- mp), because then k- T- á- 0. In general, taxes
and seigniorage do not follow random walks if private agents use the Icvel
of outstanding government commitments to forecast inflation.
It is of some interest to consider the finance of a government investment
ptoject with a market rate of term. Since this dces not affect the permanent
level ofgovernment spending (inclusive of the return on investment projects),
the tax~seigniorage smoothing story suggests that tax and inflation rates
are unaffected and that the investment is financed through an increase in
government debt. The Markov-perfect equilibrium suggests that, during
the initial phase in which investment without a return takes place, tax and
inflation-tax payments rise but during the phase in which there is a positive
return on the project, they fall back to their non-distortionary levels 11.
During the initial phase government debt rises; afterwards government debt
falls. Government debt does not return to its initial level, because the return
on the project reduces commitments and permits a reduction in debt service.
"Thie could aleo explain the dieinflation that occatred at the end o[ lhe Napoleonic
and civil ware and World War l.
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8.4 Comparison with independent central bank
An independent central bank is staffed by ultra-conservative central bankers
who guarantee price stability, hence á I - 0, r~ - pk and d~ - g- gP.
One way of thinking about it ia that the management of an independent
central bank hae an infinite aversion to inflation ((3 ~ oo) in which case the
pre-commitment outcome converges to the outcome under an independent
central bank ( irR y ir~ - 0 as fi -. oo). For a given value of k, it ía easy to
see that rt ~ rR - rM and ~M ~ áR ~~t - 0 must hold.
In order to asses the case for an independent central bank, coneider the
effecta on social welfare of a permanent increase in government spending,
~y. Since k(0) - OgIP~ one has ~VI --~ó) [Og ~- sKl~g~] and
Og 1 !~ 2
OVM --` P ~-2K1
lo exP(-Pt)Q(Q~-1)
L(Pt )Q f 7J
exp(-2rlt)Ogzdt
(09l 1 x~ (Q(Q f 1) f P f 7 lz Og~ (37)
--`PI-2 `Pt2rt~l(Pf7)Qf71
If the quantity theory of money holds ( ry -. oo), rt - 0 so that the Markov-
pertect equilibrium and the pre-commitment outcomes coincide and give
a higher level of social welfare than under an independent central bank
(~VM - OVR ~ OVI as long as fi ~ 0). If the undergrond economy and
costs of tax collection are neglible (p ~ oo), rt - 0 so that the Markov-perfect
equilibrium and the pre-commitment outcomes coincide and correspond to
the outcome under an independent central bank (OVM - ~VR - OV~ if
Q-. oo). In general, it is easy to show that ~VM ~ OVI for all finite Q? 0
and y~ 0, so that no case be made for an independent central bank.
8.5 Correction: full liquidity and F`riedman's OQM
Fundamental problems with the approach adopted so far are that, following
Obstfeld (1991b), "menu costsr in the social welfare function are ignored
whilst such costs do appear in the household utility function and that, also
following Obstfeld (1991b), the non-distortionary inflation rate is chosen to
be zero. This leads to the anomaly that the steady state of the Markov-
perfect equilibrium is characterised by zero tax diatortions, but not by full
liquidity and Friedman's optimum quantity oi money. To correct for this
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anomaly without foresaking the advantages of a lineaz example, f2(m) from
the household utility function is for purposes of the social welfare function
approximated by a second-order Taylor-series expansion around a steady
state chazacterised by full liquidity (x(oo) --p) and Friedman's OQM
(m(oo) - mp), i.e.
~(m) - 7lmFlog(m) - m] - y LmFlog(mF) - rnF - 2 `(m mFm)~~J ~(38)
and K(Á, r) is replaced by K(x } pmp, r).
Performing the maximisation in the Bellman equation yields Kir -
Kz(x } pmp) - -( ~~~~ ) , which upon substitution and equating coeffi-
cients yields ir` - F(k) in terms of ~ and Fcl. Rational expectations, i.e.
M(k) -(~n`Ptry k) must hold for all k, then gives po - (1 -~al)mp and
~tl - r I. It follows that
`cPf7)ii},-(~) -~- JaF} R9mF
TM




kM - -0(k}mF), 0 -
~Q ~ 1 ~
`. } ~Pf1'~ ~K9mF ~P k(Q) - k0
[7(Q}1)}P(A-1)-~~~~ 1 1Pt7 K7mF
(36')
In steady statc nomina) interest rates arc driven to zero, so monetary growth
and inflation tend towards minus the pure rate of time preference, holdings of
real money balances are pushed up towards Friedman's OQM, and tax rates
aze cut to zero. Ffence, the steady state of this Markov-perfect equilibrium
is characterised by no distortions whatsoever. This is achieved through the
government building up assets equal to the sum of the present value of future
government spending and Friedman's OQM, i.e. k--mF.
A permanent increase in government spending is financed through tem-




tif--(091-1 rQ(Qfl)1 ~ Pfry 0 s~V
-`PJ K'` pf p)
( l( 1 ` 92 2 (Ptry)Qfry- lv1) lRSms~i
(37~)
The presence of an independent central bank guazantees full liquidity and
Friedman's OQM, a~ - Bf --p,m~ - mp, so that r~ - p(k } mp),dj -
g- gP and ~V r--( ó) [~g f z K~ ~g2~. It follows that a case can be made
for an independent central bank only if
s
(R(Qt 1)pl r p~-ry
` P t zn J IL(P f ry)R t ry-~~~ ~~~Ct1 KImF
~ 1. (39)
Note that, when the production losses arising from inflation dominate menu
costs (KZmF -y oo), when the pure rate of time preference becomes large
(p ~ oo) or when menu costs become insignificant (y y 0), the left-hand
side of (39) tends to ( Á) so that (39) is always violated and no case
for an independent central bank can be made (cf. Section 8.4). Also, as
inoney demand becomes inelastic (ry -~ oo), rl -~ 0, the left-hand side of (39)
tends to (}1) and thus no case for an independent central bank can be
made either. In fact, (39) is for all reasonable values of p, fj, y, ~z and mp
violated. Hence, given that all contracts are indexed, no case can be made
for an independent central bank.
9 Concluding remarks
A monetary union without an independent common central bank leads, with-
out coordination of the policies of the national fiscal and monetary author-
ities, to excessive inflation and to too low tax rates throughout the region.
The reason is that each treasury fails to internalise the adverse external
effects of appropriating more seigniorage revenues on the common inflation
rate. An independent common central bank is inefficient from a public-
finance point of view, since it gives rise to too low inflation rates and thus
to too high tax rates. Nevertheless, an independent common central bank
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may be desirable because it is more likely to have a etrong monetary disci-
pline and not to succomb to pressures o( the national ministers of finance and
trade unions to accommodate their demands with an unanticipated inflation
tax. To assess the case for an independent common central bank such as the
EuroFed, one should trade-off the welfare gains associated with enhanced
monetary discipline and lower inflation against the welfare losses associated
with a sub-optimal government revenue mix. When the stock of outstand-
ing nominal government debt is high, when the priority that governments
attach to price stability is much higher than to cutting tax distortions, when
the size oï the underground economy is insignificant and when there is not
much wage indexation, one is much more likely to come out in favour of an
independent common central bank for a monetary union.
Most of the analysis takes account of three independent motives for unan-
ticipated inflation: (i) to wipe out the real value of debt service, (ii) to wipe
out the real value of predetermined nominal wage contracts and thus boost
employment, and (iii) to raise output and provide more resources for private
consumption. If any of these motives are important, a strong case for an
independent central bank can be made. }[owever, if one takes account of the
effect of expected inflation on the demand for money and assumes that pri-
vate agents do not use information on the level of outstanding government
commitments to forecast inflation, governments have an incentive to wipe
out the real value of moncy holdings so discretion leads to higher in(lation
than rules. Also, absence of international policy cooperation induces higher
inflation and to an erosion of the base for raising seigniorage revenues so tax
rates fall by less as they would otherwise.
Matters become rather more exciting when private agents use the level
of outstanding government commitment to forecast inflation. Although it is
still optimal to smooth intratemporal distortions and let tax and inflation
rates go up and down together, it is no longer optimal to smooth intertempo-
ral distortions in the sense that tax and inflation rates must follow random
walks. Instead, permanent increases in government spending are financed
through building up government assets and generating interest income made
possible through temporary bouts in inflation and taxation. The steady
state is then characterised by no tax distortions, full liquidity and Fried-
man's optimum quantity of money. Given that all contracts are indexed, no
case can be made for an independent central bank.
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